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The MoraliTy of achilles
anger as a Moral eMoTion
AdAm WAllWork
The University of Chicago Law School
E-mail: awallwo1@gmail.com 
“I was angry with my friend: I told my wrath, my wrath did end. I was angry 
with my foe: I told it not, my wrath did grow.”1
Anger is central to moral and legal decision-making. Angry individuals reason 
differently than people in a temperate state. Aristotle and the ancient Greeks 
understood anger’s practical role in forensic argument and moral judgment—an 
intuition modern psychologists have largely confirmed. Psychological experiments 
show that people primed to anger will draw different inferences than people in a 
tranquil state of mind from the same factual circumstances. As Aristotle understood, 
our ability to reach conclusions about a set of facts is influenced by emotional processes 
such as anger. This article analyzes competing views of anger in contemporary moral 
philosophy. It uses cross-cutting psychological, biological, sociological, anthropological, 
historical and philosophical arguments about the experience and expression of anger 
to critically assess leading philosophical accounts of the role of anger in moral and 
judicial decision making.
Keywords: Legal Reasoning, Law and Psychology, Legal Theories, Law and Moral Theory, 
Legal Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Legal Judgment Theory, Crime and Punishment.
1. William Blake, A Poison Tree (1794), available at http://www.online-literature.
com/poe/622/ (last visited Mar 26, 2013).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Anger is central to moral and legal decision-making. Angry individuals 
reason differently than people in a temperate state. Aristotle and the 
ancient Greeks understood anger’s practical role in forensic argument and 
moral judgment. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle advised prosecutors to make 
speeches that aroused moral indignation (orge) in the minds of the judicial 
decision-maker. Aristotle recognized that successful legal arguments 
dispose judges and jurors toward particular attitudes. Prosecutors and 
plaintiffs are most likely to win a verdict if their description of the case 
rouses the judge’s sense of moral indignation.
Modern psychologists have confirmed Aristotle’s intuition about the 
role of anger in decision making. Psychological experiments show that 
people primed to anger will draw different inferences than people in a 
tranquil state of mind from the same factual circumstances. As Aristotle 
understood, our ability to reach conclusions about a set of facts is 
influenced by emotional processes such as anger. 
Although anger is commonly viewed as an impediment to good 
decision making, as, for example, when excessive anger leads to injustices, 
like attacks on innocent parties, anger is also valuable to the process of 
moral reasoning. Anger can reveal truths or values that would otherwise 
remain obscure.  
For example, I may believe that Judaism is no longer an important 
part of my identity. Because I do not identify with Judaism, I do not 
believe that impersonal verbal attacks on Judaism will anger me. If I 
later become extremely angry at my friend for anti-Semitic slurs, this 
emotional reaction could force me to revise my previously held beliefs. 
Before my friend’s anti-Semitism aroused me to anger, I believed I no 
longer identified with Judaism or cared about insults directed at Jews. If I 
had been nonplussed by my friend’s anti-Semitism I could have continued 
to hold both beliefs.  
However, my surprisingly intense anger at my friend for his anti-
Semitism requires me to revise my belief that I am ambivalent toward 
impersonal attacks on Jews or Judaism. My reaction also provides strong 
evidence that I do care about my Jewish heritage because I took my friend’s 
anti-Semitism as a personal attack. While it is possible my anger was 
directed at my friend’s general disrespect for a historically marginalized 
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group, my acute anger at my friend’s attack implies a stronger identification 
with Judaism than I had acknowledged. My intense experience of anger 
at my friend for his anti-Semitism implies that I do continue to identify 
as a Jew. In this sense, my angry reaction to my friend’s anti-Semitism 
requires me to reconsider my beliefs about the nature and quality of my 
Jewish identity.
The emotion of anger is epistemologically valuable to moral and 
legal judgment in two significant ways. First, it focuses the moral actor’s 
attention on particular aspects or features of the data relevant to decision 
making—for example, anger at an infringement of someone’s rights may 
lead me to appreciate aspects of an interaction and its consequences that 
I may otherwise not have noticed, such as the perpetrator’s disdain and 
the various psychological and material harms inflicted on the victim. 
Second, the moral actor’s anger can provide circumstantial evidence for 
the truth or falsity of particular beliefs. My reaction to a friend’s anti-
Semitism appears to conflict with my belief that I had dis-identified with 
Judaism and its corollary that anti-Semitic attitudes are less offensive than 
I actually believe them to be. 
This article analyzes competing views of anger in contemporary moral 
philosophy. It uses cross-cutting psychological, biological, sociological, 
anthropological, historical and philosophical arguments about the 
experience and expression of anger to critically assess leading philosophical 
accounts of the role of anger in moral and judicial decision making.
II.  COGNITIVE AND NON-COGNITIVE 
THEORIES OF ANGER AS A MORAL 
EMOTION
To say that “anger” or “orge” is a moral emotion does not say much 
about the way anger interacts with cognition to produce moral and 
legal judgments. Cognitive and non-cognitive theories of the emotions 
provide alternative views of anger’s relationship to evaluative judgments 
or appraisals.
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A. Cognitive Theories of Anger 
1. Anger in “Pure” and “Mixed” Cognitivist Theories
Cognitive theories of anger interpret the feeling of anger as an implicit or 
explicit judgment about facts existing in the world. Jesse Prinz describes two 
types of cognitive theories of emotion, which I will call “pure cognitivism” 
and “mixed cognitivism.” Pure cognitivists think about anger in strictly 
cognitive terms, while mixed cognitivists recognize that anger has both 
cognitive and affective qualities. All cognitive theorists contend that anger 
requires certain beliefs. The common thread in pure and mixed versions 
of cognitivism is the view that anger entails conceptual evaluation. 
Robert C. Solomon’s theory of anger is a paradigm of pure cognitivism. 
In The Passions (1977), Solomon provides a taxonomy of the conceptual 
basis for anger and other emotions. He argues that anger depends on an 
individual’s belief that he has been wronged by another person. On this 
view, anger is akin to a judicial determination that someone has offended 
me.  Indeed, Solomon describes anger as a juridical emotion. A person’s 
anger is the product of his judgment that another person’s actions are 
offensive and blameworthy. Pure cognitivists suggest that feelings of 
anger arise from our judgment of personal offense and dissipate upon the 
refutation of beliefs giving rise to our anger. My judgment that you have 
offended me is necessary and sufficient for me to become angry with you 
and my refutation of the anger-inducing belief (e.g., you did not mean to 
cause offense) is necessary and sufficient to dispel my anger.
Pure cognitivists argue that anger is so dependent on specific truth-
conditions that a refutation of relevant facts is sufficient to quell one’s 
wrath.  Solomon says that anger requires at least three discrete beliefs: (1) 
that a responsible agent (2) has caused me personal offense and (3) the 
agent’s action is “blameworthy.”   For Solomon and other pure cognitivists, 
anger simply “is” a “set of judgments” about the truth of these beliefs.   
Pure cognitivism differs from mixed cognitivism in degree, not 
kind. For mixed cognitive theorists, anger entails a belief that “my goals 
have been threatened, that the source of the threat is another person, 
and that aggression is an available option for coping with the situation.” 
Mixed cognitivists’ central thesis is that anger and other emotions require 
cognitive appraisals, even if anger also includes an affective component. 
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Unlike pure cognitivists, mixed cognitivists recognize that feelings of 
anger are not reducible to cognitive judgments. A person’s anger includes 
a physiological affect and a cognitive appraisal. Although my anger with 
you is a judgment that you have offended me, anger is experienced 
affectively and differs from the purely cognitive process of solving a 
math problem. My cognitive evaluation that your actions are personally 
offensive and blameworthy is necessary for anger, but this evaluation 
results in the embodied feeling of anger that includes non-conceptual 
sensations such as a quickened pulse and clenched teeth. Despite mixed 
cognitivists’ recognition of feelings in the experience of anger, mixed 
cognitivists adhere to the fundamental cognitivist precept that anger 
cannot arise, change, or dissipate without changes in beliefs or opinions. 
2. Solomon’s Cognitive Theory of Anger
Allan Gibbard, Michael Stocker, and Jesse Prinz provide strong arguments 
against Solomon’s controversial view that emotions like anger are simply 
evaluative judgments about the world. Clearly, Solomon is right that our 
beliefs sometimes cause anger. However, Solomon does not convincingly 
show that certain beliefs about the world are necessary to experience anger. 
In a passage Gibbard quotes in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Solomon writes, 
“A change in my beliefs (for example, the refutation of my belief that John 
stole my car) entails (not causes) a change in my emotion (my being angry 
that John stole my car). I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone 
has wronged or offended me.” But Solomon’s conclusion is a giant leap 
from the logical force of his example. If my only reason for being mad 
at John is my belief that John stole my car, my anger may abate upon 
discovery that John hasn’t stolen my car. However, as Gibbard points out, 
I can still be irrationally angry at John. If my thought that John has stolen 
my car has placed me in a state of agitated excitement, my anger at John 
will not necessarily abate upon learning that John has not, in fact, stolen 
my car.  In my excited state of mind, I may find other “reasons” for being 
angry at John, finding fault with John’s behavior, which I would ordinarily 
consider innocuous. Moreover, I can be angry at John for many reasons 
that have nothing to do with whether he has “wronged or offended me.” 
Perhaps John is America’s president and has been stirring up support for a 
war I consider immoral. I may be angry at John for miring America’s armed 
forces in a dubious foreign conflict, but my anger at John has nothing 
to do with any “personal offense” and is unrelated to any belief that he 
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has “wronged or offended me.” Finally, Solomon’s cognitive approach to 
anger falls prey to a version of G.E. Moore’s Open Question argument for 
after learning that John has “wronged or offended” Mary personally, and 
that Mary is fully cognizant of John’s offense, it remains an open question 
whether Mary is angry with John.  It makes perfect sense for me to say: “I 
understand that John offended Mary personally, but is Mary angry with 
John?” Mary might be a tranquil or religious person who responds to 
John’s personal offense with calm congeniality. Or her love for John may 
prevent her from becoming angry.
3. A Critique of Cognitive Theories of Anger
Cognitivist theories of anger face the serious objection that no theorist has 
yet developed a comprehensive, non-circular, and non-question-begging 
account of the concept of anger. Cognitivists require the emotion of 
anger to obey the principles of formal logic. Solomon posits that humans 
experience anger if and only if they believe a responsible agent has acted in 
a blameworthy manner and caused a personal offense. Within Solomon’s 
framework, our anger can be “refuted” by learning the right set of facts 
about the offender’s agency, blameworthiness, and intent to offend.     
Solomon’s “logic” of anger surely puts the cart before the horse. 
Solomon does not offer to prove that anger does in fact always and 
everywhere involve the three conceptual elements he posits: a responsible 
actor, a blameworthy act, and a personal offense. Solomon’s thought 
experiment about a person whose anger ceases upon learning he has no 
rational grounds for anger is, at least, counterintuitive. People in a rage 
do not usually pause to reflect on the truth of their beliefs. And when 
people do pause to reflect on the reasons for their anger—for instance, 
in psychotherapy—they sometimes abandon false premises for their 
anger without abandoning the anger itself. This can happen if a person 
misattributes the source of anger, and yet remains angry after recognizing 
the falsity of his belief. For instance, Person A may believe he is angry at 
Person B for stealing his car, but is really angry at B for flirting with A’s wife 
at the Country Club. A may continue being angry at B after recognizing 
that he had actually leant B his car, because he is not really angry about 
the car but about B flirting with his wife. Even after discovering A’s wife 
and B were not flirting but merely confirming a play date for A’s son 
and B’s daughter, A’s anger at B may not abate, if, for example, he does 
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not realize that his anger at B for stealing (i.e., “borrowing”) his car was 
an expression of his anger about the flirting, which A no longer believes 
occurred. He may just “sense” or “know” intuitively that B has harmed 
him in some way.  
Moreover, decades of psychological research on anger tend to 
refute the cognitivists’ implicit claim that cognition precedes emotion. 
Schachter and Singer’s epinephrine experiment on the “Cognitive 
Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State” (1962) 
showed that “human subjects can be readily manipulated into states of 
[ ] anger” without cognitive beliefs supporting it. Schachter and Singer’s 
experiment injected subjects with a stimulant drug, epinephrine, that 
mimicked the psychological arousal of affective states such as rapid heart 
rate and increased blood pressure. Four groups of subjects were either 
misinformed or uninformed about the drug’s effects and two control 
groups were informed about epinephrine’s stimulant effects. The subjects 
were placed in one of two environments where the researcher’s confederate 
either acted euphorically or angrily. Compared to the control groups, 
subjects who were unaware of epinephrine’s simulative effects reported 
strong feelings of anger when placed with the angry confederate, and 
euphoria when placed with the happy confederate. Schachter and Singer’s 
epinephrine experiment provides strong evidence that anger is not merely 
a set of judgments, much less the set of judgments Solomon identifies. 
Schachter and Singer could make subjects experience anger by combining 
physiological and social stimuli. The uninformed participants’ affective 
mimicry of the confederate’s anger demonstrates that anger can arise from 
non-cognitive features of the environment.  
Epinephrine doesn’t stimulate ideas; it stimulates feelings. Persons in 
aroused states search their environment for causes and attribute arousal 
to their surroundings. Schachter and Singer’s experiment demonstrates 
how self-attribution of anger can be shaped by stimuli unrelated to 
personal offenses. Their experiment also suggests that the actual causal 
relationship between anger and its environmental causes is sometimes the 
opposite of what cognitivism requires. If epinephrine can stimulate anger 
in particular contexts, anger can arise without a foundation in beliefs. 
As William James and Carl Lange have suggested, people may focus on 
offenses and wrongs because they are angry, and not, as the cognitivists 
would have it, the other way around. 
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B. Non-Cognitive Theories of Anger 
1. Non-Cognitivism
Non-cognitive theorists deny that feelings of anger arise or change due to 
purely cognitive appraisals of the world.  As William James wrote “What 
is an Emotion?” (1884), purely cognitive accounts of anger are “pale, 
colourless, destitute of emotional warmth.”1 There are many different 
kinds of non-cognitive theories of anger and other emotions, but all 
non-cognitivists reject the proposition that anger requires evaluative or 
normative judgments.  In short, cognitivists assert, while non-cognitivists 
deny, that human beings feel anger if and only if they hold certain beliefs 
about the world.
2. The James-Lange Version of Non-Cognitivism
James provides an alternative to Solomon’s “pale” and “colourless” 
cognitive theory of anger. James’s bodily theory of “surprise curiosity, 
rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed, and the like,” is meant to account for the 
“bodily changes” aroused by anger that allow us to “actually feel afraid or 
angry.”2  
James reverses the cognitivist’s stylized account of emotional 
experience. The cognitivists contend that (1) “the mental perception of 
some fact” such as an undeserved slight causes (2) “the mental affection 
called [anger]” which in turn (3) “gives rise to the bodily expression” of 
pain and the desire for revenge. Cognitive theories that reduce anger to 
the perception of an insult and a judgment that “deem[s] it right to strike” 
do not adequately account for the “bodily changes that follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact [the insult],” and that constitute the 
feeling of anger. Anger is an affective state of mind that involves certain 
corresponding bodily manifestations.  
The experience of anger includes non-cognitive changes in human 
physiology from “changes in the functioning of glands and muscles, and 
in the circulatory apparatus” to changes in breathing patterns and neural 
pathways. James and Carl Lange argue that our cognitive perception of 
anger and other emotions derive from bodily responses to a threat or insult. 
1. William James, What is an Emotion?, 9 Mind 188, 189 (1884).
2. Id.
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James asks, “Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of 
it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no 
clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action?” The feeling of 
anger is an immediate affective response. It does not require conceptual 
mediation. Anger does not depend on a disembodied evaluation of John 
Doe’s words as insulting and a judgment that it would make sense for me 
to retaliate against John Doe. James and Lange argue that the cognitivist 
explanation of anger is an ex post rationalization of angry feelings. 
C. Contemporary Psychological Evidence on the 
Cognitive or Non-Cognitive Nature of Anger 
Modern psychology tends to show that anger can be aroused in the absence 
of cognition. John B. Watson’s Little Albert experiment showed that 
humans can be conditioned to experience fear and anger in the absence 
of stimuli that had previously been causally related to those emotions. 
In the Little Albert experiment, Dr. Watson exposed a nine-month-old 
child, Albert B., to a white laboratory rat. Initially, Albert B. exhibited 
no signs of distress in response to the white rat, but after Albert’s first 
exposure, Dr. Watson would make a startling noise behind Albert each 
time he showed Albert the white rat. Albert began to cry whenever Albert 
made the startling noise. After repeatedly pairing the white rat with the 
startling noise, Dr. Watson observed that Albert would cry whenever he 
saw the white rat, even if Dr. Watson made no noise: “The instant the rat 
was shown, the baby began to cry.” Dr. Watson’s Little Albert experiment 
is a paradigm example of classical conditioning. Little Albert was not 
frightened of the white rat before he learned to associate the rat with a 
frightful noise. After Little Albert made that association, he would be 
frightened by a stimulus—the rat—that previously evoked no emotional 
reaction.
Dr. Watson’s Little Albert experiment is about the conditioning of 
fear rather than anger, but its results are important for our understanding 
of the nature of negative emotions generally, including anger. If Dr. 
Watson could make Little Albert feel frightened by otherwise benign 
stimuli merely because of the stimuli’s association with scary stimuli, his 
experiment suggests the same should be true of anger. A feeling of anger 
may not be due to any appraisal of beliefs, but an arbitrary connection 
between one’s present situation and other situations that have previously 
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elicited feelings of anger. Think about the way Democrats respond to a 
Republican candidate’s speech, or Republicans respond to a Democratic 
candidate’s speech. Our experience has taught us to associate the opposite 
political party with ideas, beliefs, and opinions we reject. Many of 
their policies may even anger us. Does a Democrat’s angry reaction to 
a Republican candidate’s speech have anything to do with what he or 
she says? Probably not. Imagine a liberal Democrat angrily hitting the 
radio dial upon inadvertently tuning in Rush Limbaugh in her car before 
hearing anything he has to say. We see or hear the candidate, know his 
party affiliation, and our angry reaction is automatically primed. Adult 
human beings may be less susceptible to conscious conditioning than 
little children, but in many ways we are not so different from Pavlov’s dog.
In addition, Schachter and Singer’s epinephrine experiment discussed 
above demonstrates that people can experience biochemical arousal 
before they attribute this arousal to anger. The subjects in the epinephrine 
experiment did not identify emotions on the basis of the existence or 
non-existence of cognitive facts. Instead, the subjects first experienced 
physiological arousal, then searched for features of their environment to 
explain their excited state of mind. The epinephrine experiment seems to 
show that anger can arise before cognitive judgment. Cognition may in 
fact distort the feeling of anger by misattributing its source.  
While the epinephrine experiment’s results are troubling for cognitive 
theories of anger, they are perfectly consistent with non-cognitivism. For 
James and Lange, anger is just a state of physiological arousal caused by 
particular environmental conditions. The epinephrine arouses people 
to anger, which causes them to search for environmental causes of their 
anger. For non-cognitivists, anger just is this physiological arousal. The 
cognitive components of anger are simply ex post rationalizations of the 
bodily feeling of anger. Because anger’s cognitive component is extrinsic 
to the embodied feeling of anger, subjects can be led astray in their search 
for the causes of anger. Thus, in the epinephrine experiment, subjects 
perceive anger in terms of psychophysical responses, but wrongly judge 
its source.  
The fact that physiological stimulus can induce anger without eliciting 
a corresponding change in beliefs is difficult to square with cognitive 
theories of anger, since cognitive judgments are not responsible for the 
epinephrine subjects’ experience of anger or lack of anger. Non-cognitive 
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theorists appear to be right that emotions involve physiological states of 
mind that cannot be reduced to matters of pure cognition.  
However, anger ordinarily requires an emotional appraisal of a social 
threat that includes, but is not limited to, its physiological components. 
Although anger does not necessarily depend on judgments about truth or 
falsity, it is a complex emotion normally responding to cognitive beliefs 
and reflective of values. Unlike fear, anger does not cause a consistent 
physiological reaction such as those associated with fight-or-flight, but 
rather ranges along a continuum from mild irritation to moral indignation 
to rage.
IV. GIBBARD’S CONCEPT OF ANGER
A. Anger and Closeness
Allan Gibbard’s chapter on “Moral Emotions” in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 
takes anger as a fundamental component of moral judgment. He argues 
that moral norms of blame involve anger and guilt. A person’s action 
is blameworthy if, from a perspective of “full, impartial engagement,” it 
makes sense “for others to feel angry with him for having done it” and 
“for him to feel guilty for having done it.”3 When Gibbard says “it makes 
sense” for others to feel angry and for him to feel guilty, he imagines a 
“special” normative perspective toward anger and guilt. Gibbard would 
ask the moral/legal decision-maker to evaluate, first, whether a neutral 
observer close to the person’s conduct would feel angry with him for 
his action and, second, whether that person’s conduct would make a 
reasonable person feel guilty for what he had done. Thus, Gibbard requires 
the moral/legal decision-maker to take a “special [emotional] standpoint” 
of “full engagement” with the issue at hand.   
Gibbard’s concept of “fully engaged” anger parallels Stocker and 
Hegeman’s discussion of the closeness required for anger.4 As Gibbard 
puts it, “If my camel is stolen I will be outraged and we may all agree it 
3. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 126–27 (1990) (cited in note 7). 
4. Compare id., at 126–27, with Michael Stocker & Elizabeth Heggeman, 
Valuing Emotions 309–18 (1996).
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makes sense for me to be outraged[, but if ] I were outraged at the theft 
of a stranger’s camel far away, that would be strange.”5 Gibbard’s example 
points to anger’s close connection to actions that affect ourselves or our 
friends. It makes sense for me to feel angry if a thief steals my camel 
because I care deeply about things that happen to me. If I learned that 
a thief had stolen my friend’s camel, it would make sense for me to feel 
angry because I care about my friends and their misfortunes upset me. I 
might be slightly less angry about my friend’s stolen camel than my own 
because I care somewhat less about what happens to my friends than I 
care about what happens to myself.  
The level of anger it would make sense for me to feel over another 
person’s camel theft is largely a function of our closeness. Gibbard’s 
example of “the theft of a stranger’s camel far away” correctly identifies 
how relational and geographic closeness can factor into norms of anger. 
It makes no sense for me to feel angry at the theft of a stranger’s camel 
because I have no emotional investment in perfect strangers. A stranger’s 
everyday triumphs and misfortunes are of no concern to me. Hence, the 
theft of his camel is unlikely to stir me to anger. I am especially unlikely to 
feel anger toward the theft of a stranger’s camel far away because I cannot 
see myself or my friends endangered or otherwise affected by the theft.  
Consider how norms of anger change when we vary the relational 
or geographic connection with “the theft of a stranger’s camel far away.” 
If either the victim or the thief is a friend or relation, the norms of 
anger change according to the strength of the relational connection. It 
might make sense for me to feel merely indignant upon learning that a 
friendly acquaintance’s camel had been stolen. At the same time, the theft 
of my spouse’s camel, my mother’s camel, or my father’s camel might 
appropriately provoke me to outrage. Similarly, the theft of a stranger’s 
camel at a house in the neighborhood might arouse sensible anger among 
the neighbors. The theft at a house next door makes the neighborhood 
feel less safe no matter who the victim is. It might make sense for me to 
feel angry in response to the theft of a stranger’s camel at the house next 
door because the thief has disturbed the tranquility of the neighborhood 
and made me feel less secure in my own property’s security.  
In this regard, Gibbard follows Aristotle who wrote that anger (orge) 
5. Gibbard, supra note 3, at 126 (cited in note 7). 
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was felt in response to personal slights and slights against those in our 
care such as “our parents, children, wives or subjects.” Both Gibbard and 
Stocker and Heggeman recognize that norms of anger depend, in part, 
on our closeness to the events or our identification with those involved. 
But Gibbard’s discussion of “full engagement” and his example of camel 
stealing assumes that anger can only be stirred by identification with the 
victim. That can’t be right.  
Surely, anger can also be provoked by identification with the aggressor. 
It makes sense for Americans to feel outraged by the torture of Iraqi 
prisoners by American soldiers in Abu Graib. Americans might also feel 
justly angered by the government’s decision to go to war in Iraq on the 
basis of faulty intelligence suggesting Sadaam Hussein possessed weapons 
of mass destruction. Americans feel angry about Abu Graib and the War 
in Iraq because of their identification with America. American citizens 
cannot help but identify with conduct of America’s soldiers overseas and 
the government’s War in Iraq because other peoples attribute these actions 
to America. Americans’ anger at the government for torturing prisoners 
and conducting war in their name is a function of identification with 
America. Anger is felt in response to harms done by or against those who 
we care about.  
B. Speculative Biology and the Nature of Anger 
Gibbard assumes anger is one of “[t]he old emotions”6 tied to “the limbic 
system we share with all mammals.”7 In his view, anger and rage are 
primordial emotions deeply rooted in our evolutionary past. Gibbard 
argues that human anger has evolved from the simpler expressive behavior 
of a dog’s bark.8 Like anger, the dog’s bark is a particular and predictable 
reaction to a certain type of threat. Dogs bark in response to certain types 
of circumstances such as territorial intrusions or startling events. Anger 
is also a response to specific threats, including social slights, narcissistic 
wounds, criminal acts, and wrongs done by those with whom we are 
identified (e.g., our nation’s unjust wars, laws, and/or policies). 
6. Gibbard’s list of the “old emotions” humans “share with all mammals” includes 
“rage, fear, and sexually tinged excitement.” Id. at 136. 
7. Id.
8. Id. at 32–33.
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Gibbard uses the example of a dog baying at an intruding stranger to 
indicate the evolutionary similarity between the dog’s bark and expressions 
of anger. Barking “is a state of the dog—presumably a state of its neurons 
and endocrine system—that tends to be incited by certain kinds of events, 
of which territorial intrusion is a prime example.”9 Gibbard’s description 
of the dog’s bark closely parallels James’ discussion of being in a state of 
anger. As James explained, there is no cognitive intermediary interposed 
between a man’s perception of a slight and his embodied feeling of anger.10 
Like the dog excited by an intruder, the angry man’s  chest seethes, his 
heart-rate quickens, his face contorts, and he readies to strike.11 The dog’s 
excited affective response to the intruder “leads to special kinds of overt 
expression (barking and the like) and primes the dog toward special kinds 
of action (attack).”12 Gibbard suggests the same holds true for anger and 
other basic human emotions. Anger is a state of mind provoked by some 
external threat to oneself or one’s concerns. This angry state of mind is 
expressed in relatively invariant patterns of varying affective intensities 
and behavioral expressions. These include the contraction of certain facial 
muscles and other physiological symptoms. And a person’s anger impels 
him toward retribution against the person(s) or institution(s) threatening 
him and his concerns. In Aristotle’s words, anger stimulates “a desire . . . 
for a conspicuous revenge.”13 
Most importantly, for Gibbard’s evolutionary analogy, the dog’s bark 
and a person’s expression of anger indicate a tendency to strike or attack. 
Human and animal expressions of anger serve an evolutionary purpose 
only if they serve some adaptive purpose. According to Gibbard, behavioral 
manifestations of anger and barking are examples of “matched adaptations” 
because they communicate, and are understood to communicate, the 
intention to attack.14 If human anger and dog barks are harbingers of 
violence, then addressees who want to avoid a physical confrontation 
will tend to back down in the face of such expressions. This is adaptive 
9. Id. at 132.
10. James, supra note 1, at 194 (cited in note 10).
11. Id
12. Id
13. Rhetoric, in, 2 The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation,  Book II, Sec. 2, 1378a 31–33 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Jonathan 
Barnes, ed., 1984).
14. Gibbard, supra note 3, at 133 (cited in note 7).
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for both the addressor and the addressee. When angry scowls and dog 
barks achieve currency among potential rivals as behavioral precursors 
to an imminent attack, the threatening precursor alone will often deter 
rivals from challenging the angry man or barking dog. By instilling fear 
in the minds of the addressee, the man’s scowl or the dog’s growl may be 
sufficient to maintain control over scarce resources—food, shelter, and 
sexual partners—without a fight. Angry gestures benefit the addressor if 
they enable him to protect his resources, while avoiding bloodshed. But 
the angry man’s scowl and the dog’s bark can also benefit the addressee 
by warning him of potential danger. Unless the addressee is desperate for 
scarce resources, it is adaptive for him to retreat in response to a scowl 
or growl in order to avoid injury or death. Because these signs of anger 
are harbingers of battle, they allow the addressor to forestall costly fights 
with weaker rivals and help weak or risk-averse addressees avert violent 
retribution.
For expressions of anger to be adaptive in the way Gibbard thinks a 
dog’s bark is adaptive, the expression of anger must be adaptive for both 
the addressor and the addressee. At a minimum, this requires other people 
to recognize the behavioral correlates of anger and act accordingly. If my 
angry behaviors (e.g., scowls, flushed face, verbal threats) are not reliable 
harbingers of attack, or others do not recognize the anger of these signs of 
anger, anger’s adaptive function will not work like a dog’s bark. 
Anger cannot be a matched adaptation unless its typical expression 
automatically conveys the addressor’s intention to attack to the addressee. 
Gibbard explains that dog barks are a matched adaptation because “[i]f 
the dog who barks and growls at me is likely to attack it is adaptive for 
me to back down, and if I am likely to back down when confronted with 
barking or growling, it is adaptive for the dog to bark or to growl at me.”15 
The dog’s bark immediately incites a fight-or-flight reaction because the 
intruder understands the bark as a threat to fight if the intruder does 
not flee. Human expressions of anger can, but often do not, stimulate 
a fight-or-flight response. If the person I’ve made angry pulls out a gun 
or throws a punch, his anger is transformed into an immediate threat 
to life and limb, which provokes a fight-or-flight response. Even in this 
example, however, my fight-or-flight response is likely attributable to fear, 
not anger. The man’s evident anger, combined with his apparent readiness 
15. Id. at 133.
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to use violent force, increases my feeling of fear and triggers my fight-or-
flight response.  
Unlike the dog’s growl, a person’s anger alone is rarely sufficient to 
give rise to his addressee’s reactive desire to fight or flee. Without some 
additional indicia of violence, like an angry man pulling out a gun or 
preparing for fisticuffs, we do not normally expect violence to follow 
immediately upon an expression of anger. Consider a more typical case of 
anger than the angry-guy-with-a-gun example above. A, B, C, and D are 
average fifteen-year-old students at Marion Barry Junior High School.  A, 
B,  and C are the three leads in the school’s production of Macbeth: A plays 
Macbeth; B plays Lady Macbeth; and C plays Duncan. All three actors 
prepare meticulously for their roles and spend dozens of hours rehearsing. 
The day after opening night, D writes a devastating critique of Macbeth 
in the junior high school newspaper. D’s article singles out A, B, and C 
for special ignominy, calling them “the worst actors to play Macbeth, Lady 
Macbeth, and Duncan in the last four hundred and seven years.” A, B, 
and C are livid. They confront D in the high school newspaper’s office 
and loudly condemn D for his “outrageous” and “slanderous” review. D 
recognizes that A, B, and C are furious with him. He may feel ashamed, 
but he is unlikely to be cowed by their anger. However palpable the actors’ 
anger toward D, D will probably not believe their remonstrations amount 
to a serious threat to life or limb. Typically, we do not experience another 
person’s anger as the precursor to a fight. This makes anger very different 
from the dog’s growl. 
Gibbard’s description of the adaptive role of the emotions points to 
two possible sources of anger’s failure to produce fight-or-flight reactions. 
Gibbard writes, “Emotions, in evolutionary terms, cash out in action: in 
the actions to which they lead and in the actions they elicit in others.”16 
The emotion of anger will not be evolutionarily adaptive if: (1) a person’s 
anger does not lead to predictable actions or (2) the person to whom 
the anger is addressed (the addressee) does not recognize or understand 
expressions of anger as harbingers of an attack.  
1. Internalization 
Anger creates special problems for Gibbard’s adaptive story because 
people often do not express anger toward those they are most likely to 
16. Id. at 139.
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strike or attack. Indeed, it makes good evolutionary sense for human 
beings to refrain from barking or growling in anger before they’ve had 
their revenge. As William Blake writes: “I was angry with my friend: I told 
my wrath, my wrath did end. I was angry with my foe: I told it not, my 
wrath did grow.”  Anger may be most dangerous when it festers over time 
growing below the surface like a rhizome.  
The Greek playwrights and Shakespeare recognized that anger, rage, 
and fury can be most dangerous when buried deep. After learning of his 
father’s murder, Hamlet must “rest [the] perturbed spirit” before he can 
plot his revenge against King Claudius. Hamlet’s anger seethes just below 
the surface and boils over in his ruse to have the Players perform the 
Murder of Gonzago and in his confrontation with his mother, Queen 
Gertrude. Hamlet’s rage at Claudius spreads through him like venom ‘til 
it consumes them both. Clytemnestra waited ten long years to take her 
revenge on her husband, Agamemnon, for his sacrifice of their daughter, 
Iphigenia, to appease the war-god Artemis and gain favorable winds for 
his ships to sail to Troy. When Agamemnon returned home after the 
Greek army’s victory in Troy, Clytemnestra gave no outward signs of her 
wrath, but welcomed Agamemnon home as a conquering hero. After 
Clytemnestra’s welcoming ceremony, she took her “great vengeance” for 
Agamemnon’s sacrifice of Iphigenia by taking Agamemnon’s life as he took 
“[m]y daughter’s life, as that of a sheep or goat.” In Euripides’ play, Priam’s 
wife, Hecuba, is outraged to learn that Priam’s supposed ally, the Thracian 
King Polymnestor, betrayed Priam and Hecuba by murdering their son, 
Polydorus, who had been placed in Polymnestor’s care. Like Clytemnstra, 
Hecuba never betrays her knowledge of Polymnestor’s treachery or her 
boiling hatred until she gets her revenge by murdering Polymnestor’s own 
children and blinding him. 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Aeschylus’ Clytmnestra and Euripides’ 
Hecuba illustrate how long-term rage is constitutive of human anger. 
Memory enables human beings to hold their anger in abeyance for longer 
than other animals and seek revenge when the time is right. Hamlet, 
Clytmnestra, and Hecuba display a distinctly human form of anger that 
is evolutionarily adaptive because it makes use of the human powers of 
memory and planning. Clytmnestra and Hecuba slaughtered kings who 
killed their offspring. Clytmnestra’s and Hecuba’s capacity for long-term 
anger and delayed revenge provides a strong incentive for other people 
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to avoid treacherous actions that endanger their children. If one cannot 
know when a Clytmenstra or a Hecuba will strike, it makes sense to avoid 
betraying such women in the first place. Hecuba wiped Polymnestor’s 
genetic imprint from the world for a single, monstrous act of betrayal: 
the murder of Hecuba’s son, Polydorus. Human anger differs from a 
dog’s growl in important respects, but both provide significant deterrents 
against crossing unmarked lines.
The problem of internalization seems to be a special problem with 
human anger that confounds Gibbard’s analogy with animal growls. 
Angry people can intentionally or unintentionally hide their anger from 
others. The dog’s growl is adaptive because it is expressive and potentially 
communicative, but internal feelings of anger cannot help the addressor 
or the addressee avoid a fight if these feelings remain unexpressed. A 
person’s internal anger has no chance of cowing a potential rival. By 
contrast, a dog’s bark or growl is always expressed on the surface. Dogs 
rarely keep their anger hidden from an intruder.  But human beings, with 
their longer lives and capacity for planning, may find it advantageous to 
keep their anger seething below the surface rather than profess it to the 
world at-large. We can intentionally sublimate our anger to further other 
ends such as revenge. Clytemnestra, Hecuba, Medea, and Hamlet all 
conceal their feelings of wrath to achieve the purpose of Aristotelian anger, 
namely, vengeance. In addition, people may unintentionally sublimate 
feelings of anger and keep their rage hidden even from themselves. For 
instance, Freud claims that male children unintentionally sublimate their 
anger toward the father for possessing his mother’s love out of a fear of 
castration. For all these reasons, anger may not be expressed in external 
behavioral cues that others might take as a threat of violence. Dogs and 
other animals do not self-consciously monitor the behavioral expression 
of their anger to achieve future ends. Since humans often hide their anger, 
the mutually adaptive role of anger in signaling a potential threat is much 
more complicated than Gibbard’s growl analogy suggests.
The human capacity to hide anger creates a second confounding factor 
by limiting the value of expressed anger as a signal of imminent danger. 
The signaling value of anger is further diminished by its potentially long 
duration in humans. Dogs growl when they are highly stimulated by 
circumstances occurring in the moment, but human beings have much 
longer memories than other animals and human anger is not always 
provoked by then-occurring exigent circumstances. People can be angry 
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about a colleague’s snub at last year’s office party or not being chosen high 
school valedictorian. Contrary to Aristotle’s suggestion in The Rhetoric that 
time cures anger, some people can be angry for decades about perceived 
injustices. Recently, the New York Times reported that Clarance Thomas’s 
wife, Virginia Thomas, called Anita Hill “[n]early 20 years after Anita 
Hill accused Clarence Thomas of sexual assault during his contention 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings” to ask Ms. Hill “to consider an 
apology sometime and some full explanation of why you did what you did 
with my husband.” Virginia Thomas’ angry, and apparently unprovoked, 
phone call to Anita Hill suggests she continues to feel angry about what 
“you [Anita Hill] did with my husband” nineteen years after Justice 
Thomas’ confirmation hearings. And Clytmnestra’s anger apparently grew 
more bloodthirsty during Agamemnon’s ten-year absence. Since human 
anger can be hidden, and need not be expressed immediately, human 
expressions of anger are not simply outward manifestations caused by 
particular stimuli. As Ivan Pavlov showed, dogs bark and salivate in 
respond to consistent patterns of environmental stimuli. For the most 
part, expressions of anger are not cause-and-effect manifestations like the 
salivation of Pavlov’s dogs.  
2. Does Anger “Cash Out” in Action?
Gibbard’s theory that anger is the human analogue of growling can only be 
sustained if feelings of anger are reliably associated with overt expression 
that warn others of impending violence. Anger’s overt expression is a more 
calculated and less reliable indication of internal states of mind. As Blake 
suggests, people in the thrall of long-term anger may be most likely to 
reveal their anger to those they are least likely to attack—their friends—
and they may be least likely to expose their anger to their enemies and 
rivals who are most in danger of attack. From this perspective, signs of 
anger are poor candidates for matched adaptation. Expressions of anger 
do not provide the warning function of a dog’s growl because there is no 
obvious cause-and-effect relationship between anger signs and attacks.  
Dog barks and growls are fairly well correlated with dog attacks.  Anger, 
on the other hand, is not reliably correlated with physical violence. In the 
Marion Barry Junior High School scenario discussed above, D clearly 
perceived A, B, and C were angry with him. He probably also perceived 
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that A, B, and C could overpower him if they desired. Yet it would not 
make much sense for D to have a fight-or-flight reaction to “mere” 
expressions of outrage because these signs are not reliably correlated with 
imminent attack.  The situation would be altogether different if A, B, and 
C, brought with them a growling attack dog. Then, it would make perfect 
sense for D to feel a need to fight or flee. The dog’s growl is evidence he is 
ready to attack; the actors’ expressions of anger are not.   
Compared to dog barks, expressions of anger are poor predictors of 
violent behavior. While dog attacks typically follow immediately after the 
dog’s bark or growl, expressions of anger are neither necessary precursors 
of imminent violence nor sufficient conditions for such violence. 
Revenge may follow long after expressions of anger like Clytemnestra. 
People constantly express anger at corporations, politicians, and groups 
of people, without ever believing that revenge against such person(s) or 
institution(s) is possible. A man’s scowl is simply not a good indicator that 
he will fight or strike at all, much less in the immediate future. 
V. A BIOCULTURAL THEORY OF ANGER 
AS A MORAL EMOTION
A. Anger Naturalized
In The Emotional Construction of Morals, Jesse J. Prinz provides a 
somewhat different evolutionary account of the role anger plays in the 
moral emotions. Prinz premises his theory on the acceptance of four 
types of philosophical naturalism: metaphysical naturalism, which holds 
that existence is limited by the laws of natural science, explanatory 
naturalism, which holds that existent things must be describable in 
scientific terms, methodological naturalism, which uses the scientific 
method of hypothesis testing to adjudicate claims of truth and falsity, and 
transformation naturalism, derived from W.V.O. Quine’s holistic theory 
in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” that our beliefs about the world are 
structured in relation to the totality of our beliefs—the most important of 
which are our best scientific theories. Like Gibbard, Prinz follows Quine’s 
empirical methodology and explanatory holism to hold that anger must 
be explicable in terms consistent with—if not dictated by—Darwin’s 
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theory of species differentiation and natural selection.  Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection provides the best scientific explanation of how particular 
traits and physiological processes developed. Therefore, Gibard and Prinz 
both approach anger through a type of speculative biology that works 
backward from the universal human experience of anger to explain the 
role of anger in human development and morality. 
However, Prinz’s speculative biology of anger is far more influenced 
by contemporary psychological research than Gibbard’s theory of anger. 
While both Prinz and Gibbard accept Quine’s philosophical naturalism 
and holism, only Gibbard follows Quine’s behaviorist approach to human 
psychology. Gibbard’s account of human anger is a version of classical 
behaviorism. Recall Dr. Watson’s Little Albert experiment discussed 
above. In Dr. Watson’s experiment, the white rat was initially a neutral 
stimulus for Little Albert because it provoked no psychological arousal, 
while Dr. Watson’s loud banging was an unconditioned stimulus for 
Little Albert that automatically elicited an unconditional response of fear 
and crying. Dr. Watson’s experiment showed that Little Albert could be 
conditioned to have the same frightened response to the originally neutral 
white rat by repeatedly pairing the neutral stimulus to the unconditioned 
stimulus. After repeated pairing, Little Albert’s conditioned response to 
the white rat (the conditioned stimulus) becomes a physiological “reflex” 
to the white rat. 
Gibbard’s evolutionary story of anger relies on this classical version 
of behaviorism, but Gibbard’s behaviorism is largely inconsistent with 
his speculative biology. Gibbard describes the co-adaptive function 
of anger in terms of the interrelated perspectives of the angry person 
and his interlocutor. From the angry person’s perspective, anger is a 
straightforward physiological reaction to stimuli that naturally arouse 
negative feelings and physical aggression. Anger is an unconditioned 
reflex like Little Albert’s reaction to Dr. Watson’s cacophony. 
On Gibbard’s telling, anger’s priming function is not independently 
adaptive for the angry individual, but is co-adaptive if we consider its 
signaling function for other individuals. Gibbard’s argument for anger’s 
co-adaptive role relies on two insights. First, human beings and their 
evolutionary ancestors are social creatures. Darwin and Aristotle both 
recognized that man is inherently a “social animal.” Since human anger 
evolved in a communal environment, it makes sense for Gibbard’s 
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speculative biology to take account of anger’s societal function. But 
what exactly is that function? Initially, human anger does not appear to 
facilitate group cohesion in the way joy and grief bring people together 
respectively in happiness and sorrow. From the aggressor’s standpoint, 
anger may even be counter adaptive because it automatically primes him 
for combat, which sometimes ends in violent injury or death before the 
angry individual has a chance to reproduce. 
Gibbard explains that anger only appears counter adaptive when 
we look at anger from the aggressor’s perspective and fail to account for 
his interlocutor. But if anger evolved in a social context, the aggressor’s 
anger must be conceived from the perspective of addressor and addressee. 
In fact, Gibbard contends, anger has a communicative component that 
can be adaptive for both the aggressor and his interlocutor, but only if 
the aggressor’s anger warns his interlocutor of potential danger. Gibbard 
explains anger’s biological significance through its behavioral connection 
with physical attacks. If human anger is reliably associated with attacks, 
the aggressor’s interlocutor will associate the conditioned stimulus of 
anger with the unconditioned stimulus of attacks and reflexively decide 
to fight, flee, or otherwise placate the aggressor. Anger is a symptom of the 
aggressor’s propensity toward physical aggression. It signals that a person 
is ready to strike or attack. A target of aggression who learns to perceive an 
aggressor’s anger before his attack has a chance to avoid fights. Avoiding 
fights is usually adaptive for the aggressor and the target, since physical 
confrontations often result in injuries to both sides. In this sense, Gibbard 
argues that anger has a two-fold significance. For the aggressor, anger is 
an unconditioned physiological response to a perceived threat; for the 
aggressor’s target, anger is a conditioned stimulus—reliably associated 
with the unconditioned stimulus of attacks—that can cause the same 
“habitual” fight-or-flight reflex before the actual attack, when this reflex 
is most likely to help both persons avoid a potentially devastating fight. 
Gibbard’s behaviorist account of anger is problematic within the 
ambit of behaviorism and the theory of natural selection. Dr. Watson and 
Ivan Pavlov both recognized a crucial difference between conditioned and 
unconditioned reflexes. While unconditioned reflexes—Little Albert’s 
fear of loud noises and the salivation of Pavlov’s dog—occur naturally in 
species due to physiological mechanisms produced by natural selection, 
conditioned reflexes are not hard wired into our nervous system. Little 
Albert and Pavlov’s dog had no natural reaction to the neutral stimulus 
Adam Wallwork
The M
orality of Achilles: Anger as a M
oral Emotion
355
before the neutral stimulus was associated with the unconditional reflex. 
The following four-step schema describes what happened in Dr. Watson’s 
classical conditioning experiment: 
(Step 1: Unconditional Reflex) Loud Bang—> Fear Response 
(Step 2: Conditional Pairing) Loud Bang—>White Rat à Fear Response 
(Step 3: Conditioned Reflex) White Rat—>Fear Response 
(Step 4: Extinction) White Rat1—>Fear Response; White Rat2—
>Diminished Fear Response; White Rat 3—>No Fear Response
As this schema indicates, classical conditioning appears to produce 
anger and fear through a process of environmental learning rather than 
universal biological processes. This learning process is independently 
adaptive, but learned reflexes are not permanent and probably not genetic. 
There is nothing special about Dr. Watson’s white rat compared to any 
number of neutral stimuli he could have paired with the unconditioned 
cause of loud noise to produce Little Albert’s agitated emotional state. 
When the causal connection between the conditioned and unconditioned 
stimulus is severed, conditioned reflexes gradually diminish and eventually 
cease in a process called extinction. Thus, Pavlov and Dr. Watson observed 
that their subjects’ conditioned reflexes were quickly unlearned after 
several repetitions of the conditioned stimulus without the unconditioned 
stimulus. 
Gibbard’s co-adaptation thesis makes anger’s adaptive role dependent 
on a pairing with actual physical assaults. Gibbard suggests anger is adaptive 
only if it helps people avoid fights by reliably indicating a potential for 
violence. Just as dog growls help rival dogs avoid fights, human expressions 
of anger mitigate violence through the learned association between anger 
and violence.  
If Gibbard’s co-adaptive thesis is correct, anger helps us survive because 
human beings have developed a conditioned reflex to the natural pairing of 
anger and a propensity for violence. Perhaps anger’s value does depend on 
its conditional pairing with violence and suffers extinction in the absence 
of reinforcement. This certainly explains contemporary Americans’ 
relative indifference to displays of anger. As discussed above, another 
person’s anger rarely excites a fight-or-flight reaction. But conditioned 
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reflexes are learned responses to contingent behavioral associations. In 
Darwin’s world, human beings do not pass along conditioned reflexes. 
Our conditioned response to another person’s anger cannot facilitate the 
sort of multi-generational co-adaptation Gibbard proposes.
B. Prinz’s Conception of Anger
Prinz avoids the pitfalls of Gibbard’s behaviorism. With most 
contemporary psychologists, Prinz recognizes that cause-and-effect 
stimulation is insufficient to explain either anger or moral emotions. As 
we shall see, Prinz does not believe anger is a moral emotion, though he 
believes anger underlies the moral sentiment (i.e., emotional disposition) 
of blaming others.
Prinz distinguishes “ordinary [amoral] anger” from “moral anger.” 
According to Prinz, the brain and central nervous system detect and 
regulate patterns of somatic excitement. In this respect, Prinz follows 
the James-Lange theory of anger as bodily manifestations. Prinz argues 
that anger has evolved to prepare the body for aggression. In anger, we 
clench our fists, ready to strike; our muscles contract, preparing the body 
to shield blows; and heart rate increase, increasing oxygen to the heart, 
which allows the aggressor to move faster and quickly rushes blood to clot 
new wounds. The angry man bears his teeth and raises his voice making 
the fighter appear young, vicious, and physically imposing. All of anger’s 
arousal prepares the body for attack.  
Prinz proposes that anger’s aggression-response is triggered by a 
functionally unified set of environmental causes that represent “affront[s].” 
From his perspective, the evolutionary function of anger is to reliably 
detect “attacks . . . and other threats and provocations.” Prinz endorses 
a modified version of James’ non-cognitivism, which makes use of Fred 
Dretske’s and Jerry Fodor’s information processing theory to explain 
how people’s bodily experience of anger can represent either cognitive 
or non-cognitive content without being composed of a judgment 
about the existence of an affront. For Prinz, the state of anger indirectly 
represents things as affronts because anger is the perception of the body’s 
preparation for aggression in response to a specific environmental threat. 
Prinz suggests that anger is the “bodily perception” of aggression “that 
ha[s] come to represent specific relationships between organism and 
environment” characterized by their offensive quality. Anger-causing 
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environmental triggers are grouped together in mental files. When we 
experience anger we represent the environmental cause to be a “token” 
of the representations in the mental file. Thus, in Prinz’s view, our brain’s 
information processing system “calibrates” anger to affronts. Prinz’s 
approach is non-cognitive because it differentiates the brain’s perception 
of anger’s affective quality from the brain’s mental file of anger-triggers. 
He rejects the cognitivists’ thesis that the mental representation of an 
anger-trigger must be a “component part” of anger. Thus, Prinz accepts, 
while Solomon rejects, the view that we can remain angry for some time 
after the reasons for our anger have been abandoned.      
Like Gibbard, Prinz claims that anger has evolved in response to 
natural selection. Prinz contends that our brains evolved to sort various 
experiences in the evolutionary environment into mental categories he 
calls “calibration files.” We’ll call anger’s “calibration file” the “outrage file.” 
Outrages and affronts are classed into one mental file with functionally 
similar representations such as social slights, indignities, rule-breaking, 
and infidelity. My co-worker’s failure to invite me to the office holiday 
party might be a representation in the “outrage file” because it is a token 
instance of the general category of social slights. Representations in the 
“outrage file” automatically trigger anger.  
Anger is an evolved, bodily response calibrated to experiences in the 
“outrage file.” The experience of social slights, indignities, cheating, and 
infidelity reliably cause the somatic feeling of anger. The outrage file 
calibrates anger to social threats. Anger is the emotion triggered by threats 
to social standing and other interpersonal outrages.
C. Is Anger a Moral Emotion?
For Prinz, anger is not itself a “moral emotion.” He distinguishes between 
“ordinary anger” and “moral anger.” Prinz’s distinction between two 
different kinds of anger appears at odds with his commitment to empirical 
science and hypothesis testing. From the perspective of transformation, 
metaphysic naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, anger must (at least) 
be consistent with Darwinian biology. Prinz argues, anger (along with 
disgust) is a building block of moral emotions.  
Prinz’s tripartite schema of moral emotions draws on the three 
types of ethical systems identified by Richard A. Shweder, Nancy C. 
Much, Manamohan Mahapatra, and Lawrence Park in “The ‘Big Three’ 
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of Morality (Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and the ‘Big Three’ 
Explanations of Suffering.” Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park argue 
that all cultures are partially constituted by an “ethics of autonomy,” an 
“ethics of community,” and an “ethics of divinity.”  
Prinz contends that “moral anger” is preeminently concerned with 
transgressions against the person—the “ethics of autonomy”—such as 
rights violations and injustice. Other transgressions elicit other types of 
moral emotions. According to Prinz, transgressions against the natural 
order elicit moral disgust, while transgressions against the community 
elicit contempt.  Prinz describes contempt as a mix of anger and disgust. 
Drawing on Shweder’s three types of ethical systems, Prinz argues for two 
forms of “moral anger”: (1) Righteous anger is anger calibrated to rights 
violations and (2) Indignation is anger calibrated to injustice.  
D. Anger as Social Threat Detector
1. Evolutionary Basis
While Gibbard likened anger to dog growls, Prinz’s “embodied appraisal 
theory” of anger uses the analogy of a smoke detector. Prinz thinks anger 
is fundamentally calibrated to detecting undifferentiated offenses or 
affronts. However, I think the feeling of anger is a more specific signal 
triggered by social threats.   
Using Prinz’s analogy, I would describe anger as a social threat detector. 
It surfaces in infants “when a goal has been interrupted or blocked (e.g., 
when a toy is suddenly taken away from a child).” Typically, anger is 
directed at another human being, but it need not be. Aristotle explained 
that anger (orge) “must always be felt towards some particular individual, 
e.g., Cleon, and not man in general.” Anger has more potential targets in 
the contemporary world, but Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Darwin’s Origin of 
Species both predict that anger will be strongest in relationship to direct 
competitors within our species. We might say that paradigmatic anger 
stems from our relationship to human rivals in direct competition with 
us. Non-paradigmatic anger involves an extension of interpersonal anger 
to other things that represent a social threat to my existence, including 
my social standing in the community.      
Contrary to Gibbard’s suggestion, we do not have to learn to associate 
anger with attacks because our brains have evolved to automatically 
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recognize anger in the voices and faces of others. Psychological studies 
show that infants recognize anger in caregivers’ faces in the first months 
of life. These studies suggest our perception of anger is unconscious, 
subconscious or pre-conscious. Infants do not need cognition to experience 
and respond to anger. The infants’ recognition of anger probably does not 
depend on conscious appraisals of articulable beliefs and opinions. Rather, 
the capacity to recognize a caregiver’s anger is built into our unconscious 
or pre-conscious mental apparatus.  
This serves a valuable evolutionary purpose. Recognizing anger may 
permit us to avert danger. If our caregiver is angry, this represents a threat 
to the infants’ survival. The infant may not be able to communicate in 
language, but the infant recognizes the existential threat of the caregiver’s 
anger and responds accordingly.   
The first target of human anger is parents and other kinfolk whom 
the child relies on for survival. An infant’s wrath is utterly feckless, but 
sometimes indomitable. How does infant rage toward caregivers serve 
an evolutionary purpose? The infant cannot avenge an insult or injury, 
yet infants are the least able to regulate their anger. The infant’s wrath 
is calibrated to bodily discomfort such as hunger, thirst, loneliness, and 
undifferentiated pain. The child’s anger may represent the desire for his 
mother’s milk. His rage is relatively transparent: he screams and cries until 
his needs are met and passion is abated. The child’s noise alerts the parents 
that his needs have not been met. To pacify the raging infant, the mother 
may respond by nursing him. If the child wanted to be fed, his anger 
serves the child’s purpose and contributes to his survival.  
The infant’s anger is calibrated to his prostrate state. But the infant’s 
uncontrolled anger is not evolutionarily adaptive in adolescents or adults. 
Indeed, our ability to regulate negative emotions such as anger is crucial 
to our survival because anger leads us into conflict. Human anger tends 
to become more internalized over time. Psychologists call this maturation 
process emotional regulation. Developmental psychologists have linked 
the child’s inability to regulate anger with serious emotional and behavioral 
problems. As the infant grows, his parents may grow weary of his wining 
unless the growing child learns to regulate his anger. Most children learn 
to regulate their emotions beginning in the fourth month after birth. 
Their undifferentiated rage is modified and tailored to more pressing 
desires—say, malnourishment rather than simple hunger. Anger serves 
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an evolutionary function: it apprises us of the existence of a social threat. 
2. Normative Governance
Through the process of maturation, individuals learn to express their 
anger according to the norms of their society. Norms regarding the 
public expression of anger differ across cultures. While modern Japanese 
society condemns public expressions of anger, ancient Greek writers 
such as Aristotle and Homer praised Greek men who expressed anger in 
appropriate circumstances.  
Aristotle’s analysis of anger (orge) in his Rhetoric provides a normative 
account of anger in adulthood. Aristotle defines anger “as a desire 
accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight 
at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends.”  To 
slight someone is to treat him as having little or no importance. Aristotle 
identified three types of slighting—contempt, spite, and insolence.  
Contempt is the feeling that someone is not entitled to our respect. 
Thus, “Forgetfulness, [ ] causes anger, as when our own names are 
forgotten, trifling as this may be; since forgetfulness is felt to be another 
sign that we are being slighted [because] it is due to negligence, and to 
neglect us is to slight us.”   
Spite is another type of slighting, which Aristotle defines as a purely 
malevolent effort to thwart our goals. Spiteful men like Arnaeus, the 
suitor’s messenger in Homer’s Odyssey, show their lack of respect by 
needlessly interfering with the efforts of others. When Arnaeus found a 
ragged and disguised Odysseus sitting upon the porch outside his palace, 
Arnaeus immediately began to berate and threaten him: “Be off, old man,” 
he cried, “from the doorway or you shall be dragged out neck and heels.” 
Odysseus frowned at Arnaeus’ spiteful words and answered: “I do you no 
harm; people give you a great deal, but I am not jealous. There is room 
enough in this doorway for the pair of us, and you need not grudge me 
things that are not yours to give.” Odysseus is justly angered by Arnaeus’ 
spiteful conduct. Arnaeus has nothing to gain or lose from Odysseus’ 
begging, but he nonetheless seeks to frustrate Odysseus’ efforts to beg 
scraps from the suitor’s table by driving Odysseus from the palace’s porch. 
By trying to prevent Odysseus from eating food that is not Arnaeus’ to 
give, Arnaeus demonstrates that he regards Odysseus as a worthless old 
man who should “be dragged out [of the palace by] neck and heels.”  
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Arnaeus’ attitude also illustrates Aristotle’s third category of slights 
due to insolence. Aristotle says that young men are often insolent because 
they overestimate their own abilities. Arnaeus is young, tall, and brazenly 
insolent. Indeed, Thomas Hobbes’s 1677 English translation of Homer’s 
Odyssey describes Arnaeus as “insolent.” Arnaeus berates Odysseus who 
Athena has disguised as an elderly beggar on his return to Ithaca and 
ultimately draws Odysseus into a fight. But Odysseus makes Arnaeus 
pay for his insolence, shattering Arnaeus’ jawbone and knocking out his 
teeth before dragging his unconscious body to the edge of the property. 
However, Homer’s description of Odysseus’ punishment of the young and 
brazen Arnaeus foreshadows his destruction of the insolent suitors who 
carelessly lay waste to Odysseus’ estate without a thought of his return.  
Aristotle frequently draws on Homer’s Illiad and Odyssey to 
explain features of anger (orge) embodied in ancient Greek culture. At 
the beginning of the Illiad, Agamemnon insults Achilles and takes his 
battle prize, “the fair Briseis.” Achilles becomes enraged by Agamemnon’s 
seizure of his battle prize and refuses to fight for Agamemnon against the 
Trojans: “He hath taken my prize [Briseis] and hath done me dishonor 
[ ] [l]ike an alien honored by none.” Achilles’ “deadly wrath [ ] brought 
woes numberless upon the Greeks and swept to Hades many a valiant 
souls,”  but Achilles’ wrath was entirely rational within the ancient Greek 
schema: “A man expects to be specially respected by his inferiors in birth, 
in capacity in goodness and generally in anything in which is much their 
superior.” Thus, Achilles who was the greatest Greek warrior was right to 
become enraged at Agamemnon for seizing Achilles’ battle prize because 
Achilles, though inferior to Agamemnon in rank, was much his superior 
in battle. In essence, Achilles’ quarrel with Agamemnon arose from a 
debate over the relevant social value of rank and fighting prowess in a 
battle. Homer’s depiction of Hector’s destruction of the Greek ships after 
Achilles withdrew from battle demonstrated Achilles’ unparalleled value 
to the Greek army in the Trojan war. Whatever Agamemnon’s rank, his 
command of the Greek army was worthless without its greatest fighter. 
Agamemnon and the Greek army would pay dearly for slighting Achilles. 
For Aristotle, anger is the perception of a social slight. Aristotle 
identifies eight social causes of anger: (1) laughing, mocking, or jeering 
at us; (2) inflicting injuries upon us; (3) speaking badly of our moral or 
intellectual qualities, especially “if we suspect that we are . . . lacking 
completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question” ; (4) 
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disregard for our projects; (5) indifference to our pain or suffering; (6) 
failure to return our kindnesses; (7) opposition to us by our inferiors; and 
(8) those who insult us in front of “our rivals, those whom we admire, 
those whom we wish to admire us, those for whom we feel reverence, 
[and] those who feel reverence for us.” All of these actions elicit anger 
because they indicate a failure to treat us with proper respect. 
Both Aristotle and Homer describe anger in ways that reveal its 
complex interplay with cognitive, social, and moral judgments. For 
Aristotle, anger is a natural condition, which is neither praiseworthy or 
blameworthy in and of itself. “[T]he man who feels [ ] [ ] anger is not 
praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who 
feels it in a certain way” is worthy of praise or blame. Aristotle writes: 
“With regard to anger [ ] there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean.” He 
calls the appropriately angry person “good temper[ed],” the excessively 
angry person “irascible,” and the insufficiently angry person “inirascib[le].” 
While Aristotle recognizes that anger is a natural passion, he also assumes 
that correct perception and judgment can properly guide the experience 
of anger. Thus, Aristotle argues that “good tempered” persons are virtuous 
because they avoid the extremes of perceiving everything as a slight and 
never perceiving slights. In Aristotle’s view, people could become good 
tempered by learning to correctly judge whether another person’s conduct 
was slighting and hence deserving of anger. This decision required Greek 
men to have a nuanced understanding of their role in the Greek world’s 
complex social hierarchy. For instance, Achilles’ anger reflected a keen 
understanding that although Agamemnon technically outranked him 
in the Greek army, Achilles’ fighting prowess actually made him more 
valuable to the Greek army than Agamemnon. Agamemnon later came 
to appreciate this role reversal when Hector laid waste to the Greek ships 
and Agamemnon was forced to beg Achilles to return to the fight. Greek 
men like Achilles and Arnaeus had to be capable of recognizing social 
slights in order to defend their place in the Greek social hierarchy, but 
Greek men also had to calibrate their anger in terms of their interlocutor’s 
relative superiority or inferiority. Achilles’ anger against Agamemnon was 
justified because Achilles was, in fact, more valuable to the Greek army 
than Agamemnon. Odysseus’s brutal beating of Arnaeus and his eventual 
massacre of Penelope’s suitors reveal the tribulations of incorrectly judging 
a rival’s relative merit in Greek society. In the Greek world of Aristotle 
and Homer, norms of anger required individuals to keenly appreciate 
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relative social status relationships and norms of behavior that sometimes 
corresponded only roughly to titles and ranks. 
The ancient Greeks recognized that anger (orge) was necessary to 
perceive certain facts about the world such as threats to social status. 
Although Aristotle did not claim that cognitive judgments were necessary 
to experience anger, he believed people could train themselves to 
experience anger in the right circumstances for the right reasons. Thus, 
Aristotle acknowledged that cognition and moral training could properly 
influence feelings of anger.
V.  CONCLUSION: ANGER AS A MORAL 
EMOTION
Aristotle first recognized the significance/centrality of anger as a socially 
embedded emotion to our capacity for moral judgment. He also recognized 
the extraordinary complexity of anger as a moral emotion.  
Aristotle’s concept of anger (orge) extends from the inappropriately 
mild to the terrible extremes of murderous rage. Aristotle and Jesse Prinz 
both conceive of anger as a social barometer or threat detector. Anger 
alerts us that something is amiss. While rational anger correctly detects a 
social threat, irrational anger seems to miss the mark. A person’s anger can 
be rational or irrational even though anger does not necessarily involve 
a cognitive deduction of true and false beliefs. This is because anger is 
meant to respond to serious social threats. Anger is rational when it 
properly detects such threats and otherwise irrational. If I become angry 
in response to trifles, my anger is an irrational false alarm because it has 
been activated in the absence of the social threats it is meant to detect. 
But however irrational my anger might be, it remains conceptually 
possible for me to be angry without appropriate stimuli.  Irrational anger 
is just as real as a false fire alarm. The more inaccurately someone’s anger 
is calibrated to social threats the less likely their anger is to be rational in 
any given situation. In the same way we ignore fire alarms that routinely 
go off without a fire, we ignore the moral seriousness of an angry person’s 
anger because its accuracy is suspect.
Like other emotional gages, anger must be tuned through the process 
of acculturation. We do not expect a child’s anger to be perfectly attuned 
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to social expectations. Children often become enraged by trifles such as 
a broken toy or a late meal. They must learn to differentiate the types of 
stimuli that call for anger in their society. Youths “are hot-tempered and 
quick-tempered, and apt to give way to anger; bad temper often gets the 
better of them, for owing to their love of honor they cannot bear being 
slighted and are indignant if they imagine themselves unfairly treated.” 
In Aristotle’s hierarchical society, a Greek man’s failure to seek revenge in 
response to a threat from his social inferiors was as dangerous as seeking 
revenge against more powerful men. Too little anger and too much 
anger were likely to degrade a man’s status in the rigid class structure of 
the ancient Greek polis. It made sense for Greek men to become angry 
and ready to fight for social status when their legal and political rights 
depended on class membership. Thus, Aristotle said that Greek men 
could only rationally be angry toward their social equals against whom 
revenge was possible and potentially advantageous.
Unlike a fire alarm, however, Aristotle and Prinz both recognize the 
individual’s capacity to learn from anger and properly regulate it.  Social 
learning teaches us how to detect morally relevant threats. Like Prinz, 
Aristotle distinguishes a range of normatively governed moral anger 
between the extremes of placidity and rage. Moral anger makes us sensitive 
to serious social and ethical issues by focusing our attention and imbuing 
our decisions with emotional significance. The moral genius of Martin 
Luther King Jr. and Gandhi was their ability to articulate a form of moral 
anger that inspired righteous action without inciting violence. When 
properly calibrated to injustice, moral outrage can change the world.
The concept of moderate and appropriate anger that guides Aristotle’s 
discourse on anger (orge) in his Rhetoric lays bare two distinct forms of 
anger: the properly calibrated anger that is fundamental to moral and 
legal judgment, on the one hand, and the unthinking rage that too often 
overwhelms practical reason.  
Normatively governed anger helps focus our attention on compelling 
problems. A prosecutor in a murder trial would be remiss for failing to 
draw the court’s attention to the victim’s innocence and the brutal injustice 
of taking a life. If the prosecutor fails to tell the victim’s story, the judge or 
jury may not feel sufficiently aroused to condemn the accused to death or 
life imprisonment. Moral anger focuses the judge and jury on their task 
of punishing injustice. This focus is sometimes crucial for moral and legal 
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decisions that require individuals to take a strong stand against injustice. 
Moral anger also helps people to recognize the values at stake in a 
particular situation. I might regard the War in Iraq with casual ambivalence 
until I become enraged after seeing television images of Shock-and-Awe’s 
total devastation of Baghdad. Here, my anger revealed values I may not 
have known I had before being affected by the television’s flickering images 
of bombs falling on Iraq. Thus, anger can help us recognize subjectively 
held beliefs about the world. Before I became angry, I regarded the War 
in Iraq with indifference. Now that I am angry, I can no longer truthfully 
claim to be ambivalent toward the war. Either I value peace more than I 
realized or am more repulsed by war than I knew. Or perhaps both.
Does anger reveal intersubjective truths about the world? Sometimes 
anger is a crucial component of moral judgments about the world. These 
“truths” are primarily subjective in nature, but sometimes they can point to 
broad based agreement about beliefs.  Our collective anger at the shocking 
images from Abu Ghraib—and the recent controversy over Zero Dark 
Thirty’s graphic portrayal of American torture—appears to reflect a moral 
consensus that torture is wrong. Our anger is the emotional correlate of 
the belief that torture is wrong. If Americans were generally unaffected 
by images of torture by American officers at Abu Ghraib, it would be 
difficult to argue that we regarded these actions as morally wrong. Like 
ordinary Germans during the Holocaust, a person’s lack of anger toward 
the mistreatment of others reflects a belief in the moral indifference of 
the action. Those who feel nothing at the sight of another person’s torture 
may be said to believe such actions are not morally wrong. Thus, anger 
can disclose personal and collective beliefs about the world. And lack 
of anger at certain actions can be just as revealing about the values and 
beliefs one holds.
